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Abstract 
It is well established that gestures and speech form an integrated system of communication; 
gestures that match the meaning of the speech they accompany favor the listener's discourse 
comprehension, whereas mismatching gestures whose meaning conveys information 
contradicting that conveyed by speech, impair comprehension. A less investigated issue is 
whether or not the uptake of gestural information is a deterministic process. In line with 
recent studies in the literature, we purport that the process may be modulated by certain 
factors. In particular, we investigate the role of unrelated gestures whose meaning, which is 
irrelevant to the speech they accompany, could be neglected. The results of four experiments 
led us to conclude that unrelated gestures are not processed, and that the uptake of gestural 
information is a non-deterministic process.  
  
Keywords: co-speech gestures; discourse comprehension; mental models; unrelated gestures; 
multimodal information processing 
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Introduction 
When people talk, they move their hands and arms; these movements, which are not 
conventionalized, are called co-speech gestures. Starting from the seminal works of McNeill 
(1985, 1992, 2005) and Kendon (2004), it is generally agreed that co-speech gestures and 
speech function together as a unit, by forming a single, integrated system of communication 
(see also Church, Kelly & Lynch, 2000; Goldin-Meadow, Kim & Singer, 1999; McNeil, 
Alibali & Evans, 2000; McNeill, Cassell & McCullough, 1994; but cf. Hadar, Wenkert-
Olenik, Krauss & Soroker,1998; Krauss & Hadar, 1999). Indeed, the literature reveals that 
co-speech gestures have a function for both the speaker and the listener (for a review see 
Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 2013).  
From the listener's viewpoint, the speaker’s co-speech gestures are functional to deep 
comprehension and learning: several studies have revealed that discourse comprehension 
benefits from such gestures (see for instance Alibali, Flevares, & Goldin-Meadow, 1997; 
Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2001; Kelly, Barr, Church & Lynch, 1999; Kelly & Church, 
1998; McNeil, Alibali & Evans, 2000). Speakers’ gestures facilitate speech-reading, namely 
the perception of what a person says by observing the movements of her/his lips (Berger & 
Popelka, 1971; Vendrame, Cutica & Bucciarelli, 2010). Further, co-speech gestures facilitate 
memory for sentences (Thompson, Driscoll & Markson, 1998), and listeners’ comprehension 
of degraded (Riseborough, 1981), ambiguous (Thompson & Massaro, 1986) or highly 
complex (McNeil et al., 2000) verbal messages (see also Wu & Coulson, 2010). A recent 
quantitative meta-analysis that included 63 separate samples found that gestures foster 
comprehension in listeners (Hostetter, 2011), although the size of the beneficial effect 
depends on several factors, including the topic of the gestures, their semantic overlap with 
speech, and the age of the listeners. 
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It is well established that listeners integrate information from gestures into their 
semantic interpretation of speech (see e.g., Alibali et al., 1997; Beattie & Shovelton, 1999, 
Goldin-Meadow, 1999; Kelly et al., 1999; McNeill et al., 1994). Indeed, when the meaning of 
gestures adds, specifies, or reinforces information conveyed by speech, gestures facilitate 
speech comprehension, but when gestures convey information contradicting that conveyed by 
speech, they hinder the comprehension of that speech (Cassell, McNeill & McCullough, 
1999; Goldin-Meadow et al., 1999). Studies on the neural correlates of co-speech gestures 
have also revealed that co-speech gestures affect semantic processing of the accompanied 
words (e.g., Wang & Chu, 2013), and that, conversely, the semantic content of speech is 
relevant in co-speech gesture processing (see Willems & Hagoort, 2007 for a review). Such 
studies have also shown that the brain produces different responses (i.e., a larger N400, a 
negative deflection between 200 and 500 msec from the stimulus onset, considered as a 
marker of semantic integration) when gestures convey the same information as speech 
compared to when they convey different information (e.g., Kelly, Kravitz & Hopkins, 2004), 
and when speech is accompanied by self-grooming movements with respect to no hand 
movements or meaningful speech-associated gestures (Skipper, Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum & 
Small, 2007). Furthermore, speech and gesture are integrated most efficiently when the 
differences in onsets do not exceed a certain time span, as the co-occurrence of gestures and 
speech is useful to disambiguate gestures (Habets, Kita, Shao, Özyurek & Hagoort, 2011).  
The findings in the literature have led to the assumption that listeners cannot help but 
integrate gestural information (see, e.g., Cassell et al., 1999). However, the need to test the 
assumption that the uptake of gestural information is deterministic and unavoidable has only 
recently been addressed. In favor of a non-deterministic process, the results of some studies 
have suggested that addressees’ uptake of gestural information is modulated by speakers’ 
gaze (Gullberg & Kita, 2009) and intentional relationship between gesture and speech (Kelly, 
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Ward, Creigh & Bartolotti, 2007). The results of ERP studies have also suggested that the 
integration of gesture and speech in comprehension is not an automatic and obligatory 
process, but is modulated by situational factors (Holle & Gunter, 2007).  
In this paper, we investigate whether the listener can disregard the information 
conveyed through gestures when these are unrelated to the accompanying speech, namely 
when their meaning is unrelated to the spoken words. We present a mental model account of 
the role of gestures in discourse comprehension, relevant to establish what counts as a 
measure of discourse comprehension. We then explain why it is important to study the role of 
unrelated gestures in discourse comprehension in order to discover whether the uptake of 
gestural information is a deterministic process. Finally, we describe four experiments 
designed to establish whether or not the processing of gestural information is deterministic, 
and we draw the relevant conclusions.  
A Mental Model Framework for Discourse Comprehension and Co-speech Gestures 
Many researchers have argued that the successful comprehension of a discourse is 
tantamount to the construction of a coherent mental model (e. g., Garnham & Oakhill, 1992; 
Glenberg, Kruley & Langston, 1994; Graesser, Millis & Zwaan, 1997; Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994; Zwaan, Magliano & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). According 
to different theoretical frameworks, such representations are referred to as the “mental 
model” (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) or “situation model” (van 
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Kintsch, 1998). A mental model is an internal representation of a real 
or fictional state of affairs, and is usually built on-the-spot to deeply understand and reason 
about the state of affairs (Bucciarelli & Cutica, 2012). Mental models are special sorts of 
representations that, according to Johnson-Laird (1983, 2006), have three characteristics 
distinguishing them from other mental representations (e.g., semantic networks, expressions 
in a language of thought or predicate calculus, connectionist webs of associations): 
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1. Each mental model represents a set of possibilities that have in common what the 
model represents. Thus, as compared to mental images, models are more abstract 
representations.  
2. Mental models are iconic, i.e., their structure corresponds to the structure of what 
they represent.  
3. Mental models are parsimonious; they represent what is true, possible, according to 
the premises, but by default not what is false, impossible.  
As Cutica and Bucciarelli (2012) point out, mental models have been invoked as an 
explanatory principle for comprehension processes at a text/discourse level. Different depths 
of processing of a discourse can be detected on a continuum, starting from shallow levels - at 
which the listener constructs a mental representation of the discourse in a propositional 
format - up to deep levels of processing - at which the listener creates an articulated mental 
model of the contents of the discourse. A discourse mental model represents the state of 
affairs to which a discourse refers by integrating temporal, spatial, causal, motivational, 
person, and object-related information stated explicitly in the discourse. Thus, a discourse 
mental model captures the discourse significance.  
Cutica and Bucciarelli (2008; see also Bucciarelli, 2007) argued that co-speech 
gestures favor the construction of the discourse model because the information they convey is 
easily incorporated into that model. Indeed, as the information conveyed by co-speech 
gestures is represented in a non-discrete format, it is particularly suitable to be integrated into 
a model representation because mental models themselves are non-discrete iconic 
representations of a certain situation (see Hildebrandt, Moratz, Rickheit & Sagerer, 1999; 
Rickheit & Sicheleschmidt, 1999). Non-discrete representations, unlike proposition-like 
representations, are non-linguistic and analogical representations whose structure resembles 
the structure of the states of affairs represented (Bonatti, 1998).  
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The discourse mental model, enriched by gestural information, leads to better 
comprehension and retention of the discourse content at the expense of verbatim memory.  
This is due to the fact that mental models encode little or nothing of the linguistic form of the 
sentences on which they are based (see Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
Consistently, several experimental findings have revealed that individuals who build an 
articulated mental model of a given text have poorer verbatim recall of material than 
individuals who build a less articulated mental model (see Garnham, Oakhill, & Cain, 1998; 
Johnson-Laird & Stevenson, 1970).  
According to the literature, the quality of a mental model may be measured in terms 
of correct information recalled and correct inferences drawn from the information explicitly 
contained in the discourse (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). More 
in detail, the inferences that may be considered as indicators of a rich mental model are 
discourse-based inferences, which make explicit that information which is originally implicit 
in the text and may regard, for instance, the causal antecedent, the causal consequent, and the 
character’s mental states (i.e., beliefs and intentions) with respect to the actions described 
(Graesser et al., 1994). Discourse-based inferences differ from elaborative inferences (e.g., 
Singer, 1994), that are instead a sort of personal enrichment of the original text, and are not 
considered to be indicators of the quality of mental models.  
Consistent with the assumptions of the mental model theory on the role of gestures 
in discourse comprehension, Cutica and Bucciarelli (2008) found that participants listening to 
a discourse accompanied by gestures recalled more correct information, drew more 
discourse-based inferences, and recognized the literal form of sentences less well than 
participants listening to the same discourse not accompanied by gestures. 
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Non-determinism in the Uptake of Gestural Information: Unrelated Gestures as a Test 
Base  
According to the literature, gestures are however processed together with the speech 
they accompany, even though the meaning they convey is inconsistent with speech. Several 
studies (e.g., Alibali et al., 1997; Cassell et al., 1999; McNeill et al., 1994; Kelly & Church, 
1998; Thompson & Massaro, 1994) have shown that gestures whose meaning contrast with 
the meaning conveyed through speech, impair discourse comprehension because they result 
in the listener trying to reconcile the two contrasting meanings (McNeill et al., 1994; see also 
Cassell et al., 1999). Other studies reveal that seeing incongruent gestures may even lead to a 
better gist recall, albeit accompanied by the reproduction of the incongruent gesture, and by 
inaccuracies in speech (e.g., Galati & Samuel, 2011). The attempt to reconcile the 
incongruent meanings of speech and gesture involves processing costs, as shown by ERP 
studies (Kelly et al., 2004; Kelly et al., 2007; Ozyurek et al., 2007; Wu & Coulson, 2005).  
In our view, to investigate whether gestures are always processed together with 
speech, that is to reveal the possible non-deterministic nature of the uptake of gestural 
information, it is necessary to use gestures that do not have any sort of semantic connection 
with the speech they co-occur. On the contrary, incongruent gestures, as described in the 
literature relevant to our investigation, maintain a sort of semantic connection with the speech 
they accompany, and for this reason are not apt to reveal whether gestures are obligatorily 
processed together with speech. This claim holds for all the studies in the literature that, in 
our view, are concerned with three types of incongruent gestures: 1) mismatching gestures 
conveying information differing from that conveyed by the accompanying speech, but that is 
potentially integrable with that information. Consider, for example, calling the water in a 
container ‘tall’ while indicating its width in gesture.  The term ‘mismatch’ was originally 
introduced by Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986) for this kind of gestures, which maintain a 
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connection with the content conveyed by the speech and can therefore affect the information 
that is gleaned from speech (e.g., Goldin-Meadow & Sandhofer, 1999), although it is not 
clear whether they incur processing costs.  Since then, the term ‘mismatch’ has been used to 
refer to different kinds of speech-gestures combinations that, in our view, still maintain a 
semantic connection with the speech they accompany: mismatching gestures that contradict 
the information conveyed by speech, and mismatching gestures that introduce referential 
ambiguity.  2) Mismatching gestures that contradict the information conveyed by speech refer 
to the same conceptual domain as speech. Consider, for example, the case of a mismatch in 
which the speaker says “up” and “above” while producing gestures depicting respectively 
“down” and “below” (McNeil et al., 2000, p. 138), or the case in which the speaker says “she 
offers him a penny” while producing a gesture depicting her giving something to herself 
(Cassell et al., 1999). The speech and the co-occurring gesture cover the same conceptual 
domain (i.e., in our examples, direction and addressee), although they convey a contrasting 
content: their meaning is not unrelated to the spoken words. In other words, this kind of 
mismatching gestures are however salient with respect to the conceptual domain of the idea 
expressed in speech, and their meaning may be processed together with the meaning of the 
co-occurring speech. 3) Mismatching gestures that introduce referential ambiguity also 
maintain a sort of connection with the corresponding speech. As a case example, consider the 
gestures involved in the ERP study conducted by Kelly et al. (2007). The participants in the 
experiment watched videos of two different people describing two objects verbally and by 
gesticulating: a tall, thin glass and a short, wide dish. In the congruent condition, the speech 
and gesture communicated the same information about the same object (e.g., saying tall and 
gesturing to the tallness of the glass). In the incongruent condition, the speech and gesture 
presented different information about two different objects (e.g., saying tall and gesturing to 
the shortness of the dish). Mismatching gestures thus gave rise to ambiguity as regards the 
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actual conceptual unit: the speech referred to one object, and the gesture to a different one; 
however, both objects were possible referents.  
In our view, the deterministic versus non-deterministic nature of the uptake of 
gestural information can be tested by conducting studies using gestures that are fully arbitrary 
with respect to the co-occurring speech; this means that they refer to a different conceptual 
domain than the speech, and that they do not introduce a referential ambiguity. We call such 
gestures unrelated, because their meaning is unrelated to the spoken words. If unrelated 
gestures have a similar effect on listeners to that of mismatching gestures, then we can 
conclude that gestures are obligatorily processed; on the contrary, if unrelated gestures do not 
impair comprehension then we can conclude that they are not semantically processed. 
To our knowledge, only one study by Feyereisen (2006) has investigated what we 
call unrelated gestures, albeit on memory for sentences and under the label of ‘mismatching 
gestures’. For the purpose of our study it was instead important to manipulate the ease with 
which the participants in the experiment were able to build an articulated mental model of a 
full discourse. Hence, in our study we investigated memory for discourse.  
Since it is impossible to ask a person to speak while producing unrelated gestures, 
we adopted the following procedure. We created a computer animated (male) agent who 
produced a discourse in three different conditions. In each condition, his co-speech gestures 
either: (a) matched the speech (gesture condition); or (b) were unrelated to the speech 
(unrelated condition); or (c) were absent (no gesture condition).  
The deterministic and the non-deterministic hypotheses lead to different predictions 
in recognition memory tasks. By the non-deterministic hypothesis, performance in the 
unrelated and no gesture conditions should be comparable, because in these conditions 
participants do not process any gestures. By the same hypothesis, participants should perform 
better in recognizing discourse verbatim in the unrelated and no gesture conditions as 
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compared to the gesture condition, because in the latter condition they construct an 
articulated mental model which implies losing verbatim memory for discourse. On the 
contrary, by the deterministic hypothesis, participants should perform better in recognizing 
discourse verbatim in the no gesture condition as compared to the gesture condition, because 
they constructed a less articulated discourse mental model, but should perform less well in 
the unrelated condition, because unrelated gestures, if processed, add difficulty to discourse 
processing. 
In recall memory tasks, the non-deterministic hypothesis and the deterministic 
hypothesis lead to different predictions about accuracy in terms of correct recollections and 
discourse-based inferences. By the non-deterministic hypothesis, participants should perform 
better in the gesture condition than in both the unrelated and the no gesture conditions, and 
should demonstrate comparable levels of performance in the unrelated and no gesture 
conditions. On the contrary, by the deterministic hypothesis, participants should perform less 
well in the unrelated condition than in the no gesture condition because unrelated gestures, if 
processed, add difficulty to discourse processing. Furthermore, participants should perform 
best in the gesture condition. 
Experiment 1: Gestures in Memory for Discourse: Recognition Memory 
If the uptake of gesture information is non-deterministic, then a discourse 
accompanied by unrelated gestures (unrelated condition) or delivered without gesturing (no 
gesture condition), as compared with a discourse produced with matching gestures (gesture 
condition), results in better performance in terms of verbatim recognition of sentences in the 
discourse.  
Participants 
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Sixty students from Turin University voluntarily took part in the experiment (38 
females and 22 males, mean age: 22), twenty were randomly assigned to the Gesture 
condition, twenty to the Unrelated condition and twenty to the No Gesture condition.  
Materials and Procedures 
The experimental material comprised a videotaped discourse presented in Italian by an 
animated agent. The discourse was part of one used by Cutica and Bucciarelli (2008): it was a 
narrative discourse concerned with a series of events that occurred at a funfair (see Appendix 
1A), and lasted about two minutes. The discourse was presented in three different conditions, 
for a total of three videotaped fictions. In the gesture condition the animated agent 
accompanied the discourse with co-speech gestures (movements of one or both hands, arms, 
and shoulders); the gestures performed by the animated agent were modeled as an accurate 
copy of the gestures performed by the human actor in the original experiment by Cutica and 
Bucciarelli (2008), who had been instructed to produce hand and arm movements as he felt 
appropriate with respect to the discourse flow. Such procedure was meant to ensure that we 
investigated naturally occurring gestures (see also Gullberg & Kita, 2009). Two judges 
examined the gestures produced by the agent and found that he produced 3 deictic gestures, 9 
representational gestures, and 3 baton gestures1; they also found that the agent never 
produced symbolic gestures (i.e., gestures with a widely recognized conventionalized 
meaning). However, at our level of analysis, we did not distinguish the effect of these three 
different types of gestures. Finally, the judges excluded the possibility that any of the gestures 
conveyed information that was implicit or absent in the co-occurring speech. This procedure 
                                                
1 There is a general agreement in distinguishing three main categories of co-speech gestures, albeit under 
different labels (see, e.g., Bangerter, 2004; Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Hadar, Burnstein, Krauss, & Soroker, 1998; 
Kendon, 1983; Krauss, Chen & Gottesman, 2000; McNeill et al., 1994): (1) Deictic gestures, which locate some 
aspects of the story being narrated in the physical space in front of the narrator, and establish a joint focus of 
attention with the addressee; (2) Representational gestures which pictorially represent concrete images of the 
speaker’s thoughts (iconic gestures), or pictorially represent an abstract concept (metaphoric gestures); (3) 
Batons which refer to the rhythm of speech, and tend to have the same form regardless of the content. 
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was necessary to ascertain that the actor’s gestures were not the source of any of the 
participants’ discourse-based inferences. In the unrelated condition the animated agent’s 
gestures appeared in the same sequence as the gestures in the gesture condition, but with a 
delay of about 20 seconds with respect to the corresponding speech: the gesture track simply 
moved 20 seconds forward regardless of what was going on in speech. The last gestures in 
the gesture condition were paired with the beginning of the discourse in the unrelated 
condition. We chose a delay of 20 seconds in order to disrupt the correspondence between the 
spoken content and the corresponding gesture(s) and therefore exclude the possibility of the 
listener analyzing the verbal and relative visual information (namely speech and co-speech 
gestures) together. The underlying assumption is that the duration of working memory does 
not exceed 20 seconds (see, e.g., Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). As a side effect, 
the 20-second speech-gesture delay guarantees that in the unrelated condition gestures do not 
maintain synchrony with discourse in ways that reflect topic-focus structures or stress 
patterns. In the gesture and unrelated conditions, overall considered, the number and type of 
gestures were the same.  
Two judges examined each gesture-speech combination produced by the actor in the 
unrelated condition, and they evaluated the gesture-speech combinations according to the 
gesture-speech segmentation (an excerpt of the segmentation is reported in Appendixes 1A 
and 1B). The two judges were asked to classify each gesture-speech combination as 
mismatching (gestures that conveyed information different from that conveyed by speech but 
still potentially integratable with that information) or unrelated. They both classified all the 
gesture-speech combinations as unrelated, and none as mismatching. This procedure was 
necessary to ascertain that the actor’s gestures were not perceived by the participants as 
mismatching rather than unrelated.  
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Finally, in the no gesture condition the animated agent delivered the discourse without 
gesticulating. His position was modeled on the posture of the human actor in the no gesture 
condition of the original study. 
  In each condition the animated agent maintained the same facial expressions and the 
same labial movements. His voice was the recorded voice of the human actor in the original 
experiments, and from the beginning and throughout the discourse, the labial movements of 
the animated agent matched his speech. Figure 1 shows three frames from the videotaped 
fictions used in the three experimental conditions. The first and second frames depict the 
gesture produced by the agent while saying the word “big” in the sentence “It was a very big 
funfair” in the gesture and unrelated conditions, respectively. The third frame refers to the 
actor in the no gesture condition while saying the same word. Examples of gestures produced 
by the actor are in Appendix 1B. 
Participants, randomly assigned to one experimental condition, were invited to watch 
one of the videotaped fictions, after which they were presented with a list of sentences, one by 
one in random order. The participants were invited to consider whether or not the sentence 
was identical to the sentence actually spoken by the actor. The sentences presented, as 
compared with those in the discourse, were of the following sorts: (1) identical (literally 
correct); (2) with the same meaning, but said with different words (paraphrases); (3) 
inconsistent in meaning but said with almost the same words (wrong content). We created 24 
sentences, with eight in each category (examples are included in Appendix 1C). The non-
deterministic hypothesis predicts that participants in both the unrelated and no gesture 
conditions would perform better in terms of recognizing the sentences actually proffered by 
the actor, as compared with participants in the gesture condition. The hypothesis does not 
make predictions for the ability to refute paraphrases; having constructed an articulated 
mental model leads to formulate one’s own paraphrases, which do not necessarily correspond 
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to the paraphrases we created for the experiment. Also, the non-deterministic hypothesis 
makes no predictions for the ability to refute sentences inconsistent in meaning with the 
sentences in the discourse; the construction of an articulated mental model does not prevent 
possible misunderstandings. However, the non-deterministic hypothesis also predicts 
comparable performances with the three sorts of sentences in case of a discourse accompanied 
by unrelated gestures and a discourse delivered without gesturing. 
We coded responses of “Yes” to literally-correct sentences, and responses of “No” to 
paraphrases and wrong content sentences as correct. 
Results 
Several analyses of variance using the Q of Cochran test revealed that the eight 
stimuli constituting each sentence category were comparable in terms of difficulty (6.49 < Q 
< 12.63; .08 < p < .91). Table 1 illustrates the mean correct responses in the three conditions. 
(Table 1 about here) 
We performed a one-way ANOVA that revealed a main effect of the experimental 
condition on the ability to correctly identify sentences at verbatim level (F(2, 57) = 10.04, p < 
.0001). On the contrary, the effect was not significant for the ability to refute paraphrases (p = 
.06) and wrong content sentences (p = .12). In line with the non-deterministic hypothesis, 
both the participants in the unrelated and the no gesture conditions performed better than the 
participants in the gesture condition in identifying sentences verbatim (Tukey post hoc: p < 
.0001, and p = .02, respectively). Further, the participants in the unrelated condition and in 
the no gesture condition showed comparable levels of performance in identifying literally 
correct sentences, and refuting paraphrases and wrong content sentences (Tukey post hoc: .27 
< p < .98).  
 
Experiment 2: Gestures in Memory for Discourse: Recollection Memory 
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If the uptake of gesture information is non-deterministic, then a discourse 
accompanied by unrelated gestures (unrelated condition) or delivered without gesturing (no 
gesture condition), as compared with a discourse produced with matching gestures (gesture 
condition), results in worse performance in terms of correct recollections and discourse based 
inferences. However, performance by participants in the unrelated condition should be 
comparable with performance by those in the no gesture condition. The non-deterministic 
hypothesis makes no predictions as regards the number of elaborative inferences and 
erroneous recollections, because mental models do not necessarily prevent a person from 
making mistakes: if the listener misunderstands some piece of information, there is a chance 
that the misunderstood information will be included in the mental model, thus supporting a 
wrong recollection.  
Participants 
Sixty students from Turin University voluntarily took part in the experiment (40 
females and 20 males, mean age: 22). Twenty participants were randomly assigned to the 
gesture condition, twenty to the unrelated condition and twenty to the no gesture condition. 
None of the participants in Experiment 2 had taken part in Experiment 1. 
Materials and Procedures 
The experimental material was the same as for Experiment 1, namely the videotaped 
discourse in the gesture, the unrelated, and the no gesture conditions. The experimental 
procedure was different. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
experimental conditions; they were invited to watch the fiction, and were given the following 
instructions: “This is an experiment to investigate how people comprehend a discourse. I’m 
going to show you a video of a discourse by an animated agent. You must watch it carefully, 
paying attention to what he says. The discourse lasts approximately two minutes. At the end 
of the tape, I will ask you to tell me all you can remember of the discourse. Your answer will 
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be videotaped”. As soon as the video finished, the participants were asked to recall all they 
could remember (free-recall task); all of them were video-recorded. 
To code the results, the discourse was divided into 21 semantic units, corresponding 
to as many main concepts that the listener could recall (see Appendix 1A). Each concept (i.e., 
semantic unit) recalled by the participants was evaluated according to the following coding 
schema: 
• Correct recollection: a semantic unit recollected as a paraphrase2. 
• Discourse-based inference: a recollection in which the participant gave explicit 
information that was originally implicit in the semantic unit. 
• Elaborative inference: the addition of plausible details to a semantic unit. 
• Erroneous recollection: a recollection the meaning of which was inconsistent with the 
semantic unit. 
To clarify the coding of the types of recollection, consider, for instance, the 
following examples: “I met her at the candy floss stall. Yes, it was at the candy floss stall that 
I found her”. According to the coding schema, the statement “The man saw the girl for the 
first time at the candy floss” is a correct recollection, the statement “The man saw the girl for 
the first time at the shooting-range” is an erroneous recollection. The statement “It was such a 
vast funfair that the boy kept losing the girl” is a discourse-based inference with respect to the 
target-sentence: “It was a vast funfair”. Finally, the sentence “The boy said that he was 
shooting at the target, the round one that you have to hit in the middle, …” is an elaborative 
inference with respect to the target-sentence: “I was shooting at the target”.  
Results 
                                                
2 Although a correct recollection may assume the form of a literal recollection, we consider as correct 
recollections revealing the construction of the discourse mental model only those in which participants 
reformulate through their own words the content in the semantic units. Verbatim recalls tend to occur in the 
absence of such a model (see also the results of Experiment 1). 
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Two independent judges, blind with respect to the condition they were examining, 
coded the participants’ recollections individually; they reached a significant level of 
agreement on their first judgments for the overall group of participants in the two 
experimental conditions, calculated using Cohen’s K (.90 < K < .92, p always < .001). For the 
final score the judges discussed each item on which they disagreed, until reaching full 
agreement. Table 2 shows the mean scores for types of recollection in the three experimental 
conditions. 
(Table 2 about here) 
As a general result, and in all conditions, scores for correct recollections were higher 
than for other sorts of recollection. We performed a one-way ANOVA in order to detect the 
effect of the experimental condition (gesture, unrelated, and no gesture) on the four 
dependent variables (correct recollections, discourse-based inferences, elaborative inferences, 
and errors). The analysis revealed a main effect of the condition on correct recollections, 
discourse-based inferences, and errors (4.07 < F(2, 57) < 9.83; .02 < p < .0001). The effect 
was not significant for elaborative inferences (p = .23). In line with the predictions of the 
non-deterministic hypothesis, the participants in the unrelated conditions produced correct 
recollections, discourse-based inferences, and errors to the same extent as participants in the 
no gesture condition (Tukey post hoc: .21 < p <1). Also, the participants in the gesture 
condition produced more correct recollections and discourse-based inferences, and fewer 
errors compared to participants in both the unrelated and no gesture conditions (Tukey post 
hoc: .001 < p < .04).  
 
Discussion of the Results of Experiments 1 and 2 
The non-deterministic hypothesis, according to which the uptake of gestural 
information is not obligatory, predicts that the participants’ performance in the unrelated and 
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in the no gesture conditions should be better in terms of verbatim recognition of sentences 
(Experiment 1) and worse in terms of correct recollections and discourse based inferences 
(Experiment 2), compared to performance in the gesture condition. The results of the 
experiments confirmed such predictions, enforcing the assumption that the uptake of gestural 
information is not obligatory. Indeed, participants in the unrelated condition, as well as those 
in the no gesture condition, had better verbatim memory for discourse compared to 
participants in the gesture condition, at the expense of correct recollections and discourse-
based inferences.  
Considered as a whole, these results support the non-deterministic hypothesis for a 
narrative discourse. Within our theoretical framework, the effect of gestures on mental 
models should be independent of the discourse type. However, some studies in the literature 
have suggested that narrative contents may have a special status in favoring the construction 
of a mental model (see, e.g., Zwaan, Langston & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan et al., 1995). To 
exclude the possibility that the effect of gestures as found in Experiments 1and 2 may depend 
upon the fact that the discourse used in those experiments was a narrative discourse with a 
significant spatial content, we replicated both experiments using a scientific discourse, 
characterized by a little spatial but high abstract and technical content. Hence, we conducted 
Experiments 3 and 4 using a discourse on color perception. 
 
Experiment 3: A Replication of Experiment 1 Using a Discourse with a Scientific 
Content 
As for Experiment 1, we expected participants to perform better in recognizing 
sentences at verbatim level in a discourse accompanied by unrelated gestures (unrelated 
condition) or delivered without gesturing (no gesture condition), as compared with a discourse 
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produced with matching gestures (gesture condition). Also, we predict that participants in the 
unrelated condition and in the no gesture condition have comparable performance.  
Participants 
Forty-five students from Milan University voluntarily took part in the experiment (28 
females and 17 males, mean age: 22). Fifteen were randomly assigned to the gesture 
condition, fifteen to the unrelated condition and fifteen to the no gesture condition. None of 
the participants in Experiment 3 had taken part in Experiments 1 or 2. 
Materials and Procedures 
The experimental material comprised a videotaped discourse presented in Italian by 
an animated agent. The discourse was part of one used by Cutica and Bucciarelli (2008): it 
was concerned with the principles of color perception (see Appendix 2A), and lasted about 
two minutes. The discourse, like the discourse used in Experiments 1 and 2, was presented in 
three different conditions, for a total of three videotaped fictions. In the gesture condition the 
animated agent accompanied the discourse with co-speech gestures which were modeled on 
the basis of co-speech gestures performed by a human actor in the original experiment by 
Cutica and Bucciarelli (2008).  
Two judges examined the gestures produced by the agent and found that he produced 
13 representational gestures, 1 deictic gesture, 6 baton gestures and no symbolic gestures. 
They also excluded the possibility that any of the gestures conveyed information that was 
implicit or absent in the co-occurring speech. In the unrelated condition, the animated agent’s 
gestures appeared in the same sequence as in the gesture condition, but with a delay of about 
20 seconds with respect to the corresponding speech: the gesture track simply moved 20 
seconds forward regardless of what was going on in speech. In the gesture and unrelated 
conditions, the number and type of gestures were the same. Finally, in the no gesture 
condition the animated agent delivered the discourse without gesticulating. In each condition 
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the animated agent maintained the same facial expressions and the same labial movements. 
His voice was the recorded voice of the human actor in the original experiments, and from 
the beginning and throughout the discourse, the labial movements of the animated agent 
matched his speech. Figure 2 shows three frames from the videotaped fictions used in the 
three experimental conditions. The first and second frames depict the gesture produced by the 
agent while saying the word “water” in the sentence “and blue is refreshing like water” in the 
gesture and unrelated conditions, respectively. The third frame refers to the animated agent in 
the no gesture condition while saying the same word. Examples of gestures produced by the 
actor are in Appendix 2B. 
The experimental procedures were identical to those of Experiment 1: participants, 
randomly assigned to one condition, were invited to watch one of the videotaped fictions, 
after which they were presented with a list of sentences, one by one in random order. We 
created 24 sentences, with eight in each category: literally correct, paraphrases, wrong content 
(examples are included in Appendix 2C).  
Results 
Several analyses of variance using the Q of Cochran test revealed that the eight stimuli 
constituting each sentence category were comparable in terms of difficulty (12.48 < Q < 
21.05; .88 < p < .43). Table 3 illustrates the mean correct responses in the three conditions. 
(Table 3 about here) 
We performed a one-way ANOVA that revealed a main effect of the experimental 
condition on the ability to correctly identify sentences at verbatim level (F(2, 42) = 9.07, p = 
.001). On the contrary, the effect was not significant for the ability to refute paraphrases (p = 
.11) and wrong content sentences (p = .28). In line with the predictions of the non-
deterministic hypothesis, participants in both the unrelated (Tukey post hoc: p < .0001) and 
the no gesture conditions (p = .03) performed better than participants in the gesture condition 
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in identifying literally correct sentences. Participants in the unrelated and no gesture 
condition also showed comparable levels of performance in identifying literally correct 
sentences, and refuting paraphrases and wrong content sentences (Tukey post hoc: .11 < p < 
.66). 
 
Experiment 4: A Replication of Experiment 2 Using a Discourse with a Scientific 
Content 
In Experiment 4 we expected to replicate the findings that participants in the unrelated 
condition and in the no gesture condition perform worse than participants in the gesture 
condition in terms of recollection of correct information and production of discourse-based 
inferences. We also expected to replicate the finding that participants in the unrelated and the 
no gesture conditions have comparable performances. 
Participants 
Forty-five students from Milan University voluntarily took part in the experiment (28 
females and 17 males, mean age: 22). Fifteen participants were randomly assigned to the 
gesture condition, fifteen to the unrelated condition, and fifteen to the no gesture condition. 
None of the participants in Experiment 4 had taken part in Experiments 1, 2 or 3. 
Materials and Procedures 
The experimental material was the same as for Experiment 3, namely the videotaped 
color discourse in the gesture, the unrelated, and the no gesture conditions. The procedures 
were identical to those of Experiment 2. Again, to ascertain that the actor’s gestures were not 
perceived by the participants as mismatching rather than unrelated, two judges examined 
each gesture-speech combination produced by the actor in the unrelated condition of the color 
discourse. They did not classify any of them as gesture-speech mismatches.  
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To code the results, the discourse was divided into 18 semantic units, corresponding 
to as many main concepts that the listener could recall (see Appendix 2A). Each concept (i.e. 
semantic unit) recalled by the participants was evaluated according to the coding schema 
adopted in Experiment 2.  
Results 
Two independent judges, blind with respect to the condition they were examining, 
coded the participants’ recollections individually; they reached a significant level of 
agreement on their first judgments for the overall group of participants in the two 
experimental conditions, calculated using Cohen’s K (.88 < K < .95, p always < .001). For the 
final score the judges discussed each item on which they disagreed, until reaching full 
agreement. Table 4 shows the mean scores for types of recollection in the three experimental 
conditions. 
(Table 4 about here) 
As a general result, and in all experimental conditions, scores for correct 
recollections were higher than for other sorts of recollection. We performed a one-way 
ANOVA in order to detect the effect of the experimental condition on the four types of 
recollection. The results revealed a main effect of the experimental condition on correct 
recollections (F(2, 42) = 18.01, p < .0001) and discourse-based inferences (F(2, 42) = 3.68, p 
= .03). The effect was not significant for elaborative inferences (p = .81) and errors (p = .11). 
In line with the predictions of the non-deterministic hypothesis, participants in the unrelated 
conditions produced correct recollections and discourse-based inferences to the same extent as 
participants in the no gesture condition (Tukey post hoc: .37 < p < .91). Also, participants in 
both the unrelated and no gesture conditions produced less correct recollections and 
discourse-based inferences than participants in the gesture condition (Tukey post hoc: .0001 < 
p < .04). 
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General Discussion and Conclusions  
There is a huge body of literature on in-depth investigations into the role of co-
speech gestures in discourse comprehension. The focus on gestures whose meaning is either 
consistent or in contrast with the meaning of the speech they accompany has led to the 
conclusion that all gestures are however processed. The aim of our study was to verify the 
determinism of the uptake of unrelated gestural information. In our view, the study fills in a 
gap by examining whether the uptake of gesture information is mandatory even in cases 
where gestures are arbitrary with respect to speech. To this aim, the participants in our 
experiments dealt with an experimental condition (unrelated condition) in which the 
correspondence in meaning between gestures and speech was disrupted by inserting a 20 
seconds delay between the speech and the naturally co-occurring gesture; the delay disrupts 
the correspondence because the duration of working memory does not exceed 20 seconds.  
The un-relatedness of the resulting combination gesture-speech was further excluded by two 
independent judges. Therefore, we are allowed to consider the gestures in the unrelated 
condition as conveying an arbitrary meaning with respect to the meaning conveyed by 
speech. As a general result, and against the deterministic hypothesis, gestures unrelated to the 
speech they accompany produced the same effect as the absence of gestures in both 
recognition and recall memory tasks. Indeed, the results of Experiments 1 and 3, when taken 
together, showed that verbatim recall was greater after listening to a discourse accompanied 
by unrelated gestures or no gestures than a discourse accompanied by gestures. Also, the 
results of Experiments 2 and 4 showed that a person who listens to a discourse accompanied 
by unrelated gestures or no gestures at all, will recall less correct information and draw fewer 
discourse-based inferences compared to a person who listens to a discourse accompanied by 
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gestures. In particular, the presence of unrelated gestures did not negatively affect 
participants’ performance with respect to the absence of gestures.  
Our results enforce the assumption that when gestures are unrelated, the listener does 
not process their meaning. In particular, they suggest that a mistiming of 20 seconds is 
sufficient to impede the uptake of gesture information. Indeed, in both recognition tasks, we 
found that unrelated gestures did not impair verbatim memory for discourse, whereas co-
speech gestures did. In both recollection tasks, unrelated gestures did not favor deep 
comprehension and learning, whereas matching gestures did, although they did not impair 
comprehension when compared with a situation in which an actor produced a discourse 
without gesticulating.  
Our results are consistent with findings revealing that the uptake of gestural 
information can be modulated and influenced by some (external) factors. Gullberg and Kita 
(2009), for example, found that both social (e.g., speakers looking at their own gestures) and 
physical (e.g., the gesture’s location in gesture space) factors, which we kept constant in our 
experiments, may modulate the uptake of gestural information.  
Our results only apparently contrast with those in the literature showing that 
mismatching gestures are processed together with the speech they accompany (see, e.g., 
Alibali et al., 1997; Cassell et al., 1999; McNeill et al., 1994; Kelly & Church, 1998; 
Thompson & Massaro, 1994). Indeed, these studies tested combinations of gesture-speech 
which however maintain a certain sort of semantic relationship, and we believe that this is 
why they led to conclude that the uptake of gestures information is mandatory. As the studies 
in the literature did not consider the case in which gesture and speech are unrelated in 
meaning, we argued for the necessity to adopt a new paradigm, which albeit exploiting an 
artificial combination of gesture-speech, disrupts the semantic relationship between gesture 
and speech, allowing to discover whether gestures’ processing is mandatory.  
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A further case of apparent contrast between our results and those in the literature are 
the results by Kelly, Ozyurek, and Maris (2010), who used a prime-effect paradigm with 
different levels of incongruity between gestures and speech and found that the uptake of 
gestural information is obligatory, and that the strength of the incongruence between speech 
and gesture affects processing, as strong incongruities impair the integration more than weak 
incongruities.  In their experiment, the higher level of incongruity, i.e., for instance “chop” in 
speech and “twist” in gesture, is similar to our concept of unrelated gesture. In our view, the 
difference between their result and ours is due to the experimental material. In particular, the 
participants in their investigation dealt with simple combinations of gesture and word, 
whereas the participants in our investigation encountered full discourses. Hence, it is possible 
that the participants in the unrelated condition of our experiments, at a certain moment from 
the beginning of the discourse, realized that gestures were incongruent and were therefore 
able to disregard them.  
Our study has three main limits. First, given the nature of the unrelated condition, in 
which gestures are temporally switched with respect to their natural occurrence, the 
ecological validity of the results is limited. Second, we did not analyze the co-occurrence of 
speech with different types of gestures; our experimental design was not apt to investigate 
deictic, representational, and baton gestures separately. In future, more fine-grained studies 
might make this kind of investigation possible; for instance, it would be interesting to focus 
on batons, the gesture category that is least dependent on discourse content, and whose 
facilitative effect on memory, as pointed out by So, Sim Chen-Hui, and Low Wei-Shan 
(2012), may rely on partially different cognitive mechanisms. Finally, although we found that 
gestures are not processed when they are clearly unrelated with speech, our experimental 
design has not the granularity to shed light on the steps through which the listeners process 
gesture’s meaning.  
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Our results suggest to speculate that the participants in our experiments did not 
monitor the gestures-speech relatedness for the entire length of the discourse; if this would be 
the case, such monitoring would have resulted in a poorer performance in the unrelated 
condition compared to the no gesture condition. But future studies could asses more precisely 
when, in listening to a discourse in which gestures and speech are unrelated, do the listeners 
begin to neglect gestures’ meaning. . 
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Appendix 1 
Appendix 1A The funfair discourse used in Experiments 1 and 2 (Semantic units are 
separated by slashes)  
It was there, at the funfair, it was there that I found her,/ and it was at the funfair that I lost 
her./ It was a vast funfair./ A funfair with shooting-ranges and candy floss stalls/ and 
Japanese bagatelle tables, stalls with bottles of champagne/ and showmen’s booths and 
roundabouts./ And the roundabouts turned and creaked/ and the candy floss scented the air/ 
and the rifles shot./ I was shooting at the target./ I can shoot at the target very well and I am 
proud of it./ No, wait a moment, I am wrong!/ I did not meet her at the shooting-range./ I met 
her at the candy floss stall. Yes, it was at the candy floss stall that I found her./ The candy 
floss scented the air,/ and she was eating it/ and she blew on her candy/ and I was all covered 
with white powder./ She started laughing/ and I asked her: “What’s your name?”/ And she 
shouted to me: “I’ll tell you later”./   
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Appendix 1B Examples of co-speech gestures produced by the animated agent in both the 
gesture condition and the unrelated condition (Experiments 1 and 2 - Funfair discourse).  
The left and the central columns present the co-occurrence of speech and gestures in the 
gesture condition, whereas the right and the central columns present the co-occurrence of 
speech and gestures in the unrelated conditions. Please note that the beginning of each 
condition is highlighted in bold. 
Underscoring of semantic units indicates the duration of the gesture with the corresponding 
number. 
 
 
Semantic units 
Gesture condition 
 
Computer animated agent’s gestures 
 
Semantic units  
Unrelated 
condition 
BEGINNING OF 
GESTURE 
CONDITION 
FICTION 
 
 
 
 
 
It was there, at 
the funfair, it was 
there that I found 
her, 
Hands still, resting on thighs. 
and it was at the 
funfair that I lost 
her.  
Hands still, resting on thighs.   
It was a vast 
funfair.1 
 
1) Raises both hands simultaneously to a position at the 
level of the navel, palms down.  
From here, the hands are raised to head height in a 
continuous movement, curving outwards as if describing 
a circle, with palms facing forward towards the 
hypothetical interlocutor. Both hands return to chest 
level. 
The candy floss 
scented the air, 
and she was eating 
it, and she blew on 
her candy1 
A funfair with 
shooting-ranges2 
and candy floss 
stalls, 3  
 
2) The right hand closes into a fist, and the left hand 
remains open with palm facing to the right; then both 
hands open and assume a position as if to point to the 
agent’s left; the left hand is slightly higher than the 
right; the left arm is almost fully straightened, while the 
right one is more bent. Then both hands move down to 
the thighs. 
3) The right hand is rapidly raised to stomach level, 
outside the line of the body; the hand is half open as if to 
indicate a direction; it is then quickly moved back to rest 
on the thigh. 
And I was all 
covered with white 
powder2 
She started 
laughing3  
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and Japanese 
bagatelle tables4 
stalls with bottles 
of champagne,5  
4) The right hand is raised from the right leg and moves 
to one side of the body (further from the body than in 
the previous movement), almost to stomach height. The 
hand is half open, with the fingers towards a 
hypothetical interlocutor, as if to indicate a direction; the 
arm is partly bent.  
and I asked her: 
“What’s your 
name?”4 
5) Just before the right hand comes to rest on the leg, the 
left hand is raised from the other leg and moves forward; 
the thumb and index finger are extended and pointing, 
while the other fingers are partly bent and the palm is 
almost hidden by the fingers. The hand then returns 
directly to the left leg. 
And she shouted to 
me, “I’ll5 tell you 
later” 
and showmen’s 
booths6 and 
roundabouts.7 
6) Both hands are raised simultaneously from the legs. 
The right hand is open with the palm towards the right 
leg, away from the body, with the thumb pointed 
upwards; the left hand is open and moves away from the 
body, with the palm still facing the thigh, and the index 
finger and thumb straight. Both hands then move back to 
the thighs. 
7) The left hand is raised immediately from the left leg 
and moved forward and to the right, showing the palm 
with fingers open, to chest height (the elbow is bent at 
90°), and remains in that position for 2 seconds; the 
right hand is open and remains still at hip height, with 
the palm towards the thigh. 
BEGINNING OF 
UNRELATED 
CONDITION 
FICTION 
 
(The actor is 
silent)6  
 
It was there, at the 
funfair7 
And the 
roundabouts 
turned and 
creaked,8  
8) Both hands start to move from left to right, held 
forwards at chest height; the right hand continues the 
movement gradually downwards to hip level. Then both 
hands are moved back towards the legs but do not come 
to rest on them. The left hand, open and palm facing 
downwards, slides downwards and outwards from the 
left leg, with the arm extended. In a continuous 
movement, the hand moves back upwards in a circular 
fashion and comes back to rest on the left thigh.  
it was there8 that I 
found her, 
 
 
and the candy 
floss scented the 
air,9  
 
9) Both hands are moved away from the legs up to the 
mouth area, in a cupped position 2-3 cm apart with the 
palms towards the mouth and fingers slightly bent, 
moving rapidly backwards and forwards for around 2 
seconds.  
 
and it was at the 
funfair that I lost 
her9. 
and the rifles 
shot.10 
10) Then the open right hand moves to the chest area, 
while the left hand moves down to hip level. The left 
hand, open and palm upwards, is raised in a circular 
movement, and then from the hip area it is moved up to 
the chest, near to the right hand.  
It was a vast 
funfair10  
I was shooting at 
the target.11 
 
 
 
 
 
11) Both hands are at chest height, with palms facing 
each other; both hands are moved towards the left. The 
left hand moves away from the body, while the right 
remains at stomach level. The ring and little fingers of 
the left hand close, while the other digits are straight; at 
the same time, the middle, ring and little fingers of the 
right hand close, while the thumb and index finger 
remain straight and extended.  
A funfair11 with 
shooting-ranges12 
and candy floss 
stalls,13 
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I can shoot at the 
target very well12 
and I am proud of 
it.13 
 
 
12) From that position, the hands are raised momentarily 
to shoulder height, with index fingers pointing upwards, 
and then immediately lowered to their initial position. 
The right hand is open, with the palm towards the 
stomach and the arm bent; the left hand is at the front, 
with thumb and index finger straight, while the other 
fingers and the right arm are slightly bent. 
13) The hands are brought up to cover the face for 2 
seconds; the hands are open, with the palms towards the 
face. 
No, no,14 wait a 
moment15 …. 
 
 
 
 
14) The hands remain in this position for 2 seconds and 
then slowly descend to hip level. When the hands reach 
stomach level, the right hand moves towards the left, 
while the left hand opens and moves forwards, with the 
fingers almost fully extended. Then the hands move 
directly towards the thighs, but do not actually come to 
rest on them.  
15) The left hand is raised quickly up to the top of the 
chest, with the palm towards the right and fingers open. 
The right hand is raised slightly, up to hip level, with the 
palm still facing downwards. The fingers are semi-
extended. Both hands move rhythmically at around hip 
height and are brought slightly outwards.  
and Japanese 
bagatelle tables14 
stalls with bottles 
of champagne,15 
I am wrong! The hands stay still near the legs for 7 seconds. and showmen’s 
booths and 
roundabouts. 
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Appendix 1C Examples of sentences used for the Recognition Task of Experiment 1  
Literal  I can shoot at the target very well  
Paraphrases I am really able to shoot at the target  
Wrong   I do not know how to shoot at the target 
 
Literal  I shot, the egg popped up. I turned aside, she wasn’t there any more. 
Paraphrases When I shot at the egg she disappeared. 
Wrong While I was going to shoot to the egg, I turned aside and she 
wasn’t there any more  
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2A The color discourse used in Experiments 3 and 4 (Semantic units are separated 
by slashes)  
It’s beyond dispute/ that colors carry strong expressive components./ Some attempts have 
been made to describe the specific expressive characters of the various colors/ and to draw 
some general conclusions from the symbolic use the different cultures have made of them./ 
There is a very widespread belief that the expression of colors is based on association./ 
Therefore, red should be considered exciting/ because it reminds us of the connotations of 
fire, blood and revolution./ Green evokes the restorative thought of nature,/ and blue is 
refreshing like water./ The theory of association, however, is not more interesting or prolific 
in this field than in others./ In addition, the effects of colors are too direct and spontaneous/ to 
be simply the result of an interpretation given through knowledge./ On the other hand, no 
hypothesis has been advanced so far on the kind of physiological process/ that could help to 
explain the influence of colors on the organism./ The need to discuss the form makes us feel 
on more solid ground, though,/ as we can compare the expression of specific patterns/with 
that or more general properties/ such as spatial orientation, balance or the geometrical 
characteristics of the outlines. 
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Appendix 2B Examples of co-speech gestures produced by the animated agent in both the 
gesture condition and the unrelated condition (Experiments 3 and 4 – Color discourse) 
The left and the central columns present the co-occurrence of speech and gestures in the 
gesture condition, whereas the right and the central columns present the co-occurrence of 
speech and gestures in the unrelated conditions. Please note that the beginning of each 
condition is highlighted in bold. Underscoring of semantic units indicates the duration of the 
gesture with the corresponding number. 
NB: if the numbering of the gestures corresponding to the semantic units is not perfectly 
sequential, this is likely to be due to changes in the sentence structure in the translation from 
the Italian. We have therefore preferred to maintain the speech-gesture correspondence rather 
than the sequential gesture numbering. 
 
 
Semantic units 
Gesture condition 
 
Computer animated agent’s gestures 
Semantic units 
Unrelated 
condition 
BEGINNING OF 
GESTURE 
CONDITION 
FICTION 
 
It’s beyond 
dispute that colors 
carry strong 
expressive 
components1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) The agent’s hands are resting on his legs at knee height. He 
raises both hands simultaneously to the level of the navel. From 
here, the hands open outwards with palms facing slightly 
forwards, towards the hypothetical interlocutor. The hands are 
then brought swiftly back to the thighs. 
 
 
 
 
There is a very 
widespread belief 
that the 
expression of 
colors is based on 
association1. 
Some attempts 
have been made to 
describe the 
specific 
expressive 
characteristics of 
the various colors2 
 
2) The left hand is raised from the left leg up to the mouth area, 
half open and with the palm towards the right. The hand moves 
down to chest level in a continuous movement and then 
assumes an up-down undulating motion. Initially, the fingers 
are all partly closed, then the index finger gradually extends 
almost completely; the palm of the hand faces towards the 
interlocutor (first at mouth level and then at chest height). 
At the same time, the open right hand is raised from the right 
leg to a position at the level of the navel, with the palm facing 
Therefore, red 
should be 
considered 
exciting,2 
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 to the left and fingers half extended.  
and to draw some 
general 
conclusions from 
the symbolic use 
the different 
cultures have 
made of them.3 
3) From the chest, both hands move down onto the legs and 
closer to each other (to about 2-3 cm apart), with palms facing 
each other, fingers extended and thumbs pointing upwards. The 
right hand is raised from the right leg up to chest level, with 
fingers open, while the left hand rises at the same time in line 
with the right hand, first with fingers half closed and then 
extended. The right hand is then brought back onto the right 
leg, with palm facing to the left and thumb raised, while the left 
hand moves in small circles, with fingers semi-extended. 
Finally, the left hand moves back onto the left leg, with the 
palm facing to the right and fingers extended. 
because it 
reminds us of the 
connotations of 
fire, blood and 
revolution3. 
There is a very 
widespread6 
belief4 that the 
expression of 
colors is based on 
association5. 
 
 
4) The left hand is raised from the left leg up to neck height, 
with the index finger pointing upwards and the other fingers 
half closed, whereas the right hand remains open at hip level, 
with the palm facing to the left. 
5) The left hand moves down from the mouth to shoulder 
height, then in an up-down waving motion, first with the hand 
open and then with fingers half closed, with the palm facing 
downwards and to the right.  
6) The right hand is raised from the right thigh up to the same 
height as the left hand; both palms are parallel to the thighs. 
The hands move forwards, and both palms turn towards the 
agent; the arms remain partly bent. 
Green4 evokes 
the restorative 
thought of 
nature5, 
 
and blue6  
 
 
 
is refreshing like 
water7. 
Therefore, red7 
should be 
considered 
exciting,8 
7) Both hands are brought up to chest height, first closer 
together then further apart again. 
8) With both hands open at chest level, the right hand moves 
closer to then further from the left hand.  
because it reminds 
us of the 
connotations of 
fire8, blood9 and 
revolution10. 
 
8) From the chest, both hands are moved to the shoulder area, 
with palms facing each other and fingers extended. They are 
then quickly lowered to waist level, with fingers closed. The 
fingers immediately reopen and the right hand is raised up to 
the right shoulder; the fingers open and the index finger points 
upwards above the shoulder, with the palm turned slight to the 
left. The left hand stops at chest height, facing forwards with 
the palm open. 
9) The left hand moves up and down repeatedly, while the right 
hand remains at shoulder level. 
10) Both hands are moved to chest level; the fingers are open 
and the hands extended forwards with palms facing the 
interlocutor. The index fingers appear to point upwards. 
The theory of 
association, 
however, 8 is not 
more interesting 
or prolific9 in this 
field10 than in 
others. 
 
 
 
Green11 evokes  
the restorative 
thought of 
nature12, 
 
 
11) The left hand is lowered slightly and turned, in an open 
position, so that the palm faces upward, with the thumb and 
index finger more extended than the other digits. It then turns 
again, so as to finish with the palm facing the right hand. 
12) Both hands are turned towards the agent and slightly folded 
(i.e. with the fingers of the right hand covering those of the 
left). Both hands then move outwards, with a turn of the arms, 
until the right hand is outside the line of the body, while the left 
hand remains slightly closer to the body. The hands return to 
chest level. 
In addition,11 the 
effects of colors 
are too direct 
and12 
spontaneous 
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and blue13 is 
refreshing like 
water14. 
13) The right hand moves down from the chest onto the right 
thigh, while the left hand is raised to shoulder level. 
14) The left hand is moved repeatedly up and down, moving 
the fingers at the same time.  
to be simply the 
result13 of an 
interpretation 
given14 through 
knowledge. 
The theory of 
association, 
however, is not 
more interesting15 
or prolific16 in this 
field than in 
others. 
15) The left hand moves down from the shoulder to the chest 
and the palm is turned towards the interlocutor, with fingers 
half closed. Simultaneously, the right hand is raised from the 
right leg up to the same height as the left hand, with the palm 
facing towards it.  
16) Both hands close and are then moved from the chest to rest 
on the legs. 
BEGINNING OF 
UNRELATED 
CONDITION 
FICTION  
 
It’s beyond 
dispute15 
 
that colors carry 
strong expressive 
components16 
 
In addition17, the 
effects of colors 
are too direct and 
spontaneous18 
17) The hands are raised to hip level, with palms facing each 
other and fingers open. 
 
18) The right hand remains at hip level, open and with the palm 
facing left, and moves outwards away from the body. The left 
hand is raised to chest height, outside the line of the body, and 
is pushed quickly forwards, with fingers open, and then pulled 
back equally quickly towards the chest 
 
19) The right hand is raised from the right leg by about 5 cm, 
with the palm towards the leg, while the left hand remains at 
chest level 
Some attempts 
have been made17 
to describe  
 
 
the specific18 
expressive 
characteristics of 
the various 
colors19 
to be simply the 
result19 of an 
interpretation 
given through 
knowledge20 
20) The right hand moves to around stomach level, away from 
the body; the hand is open with the index finger almost fully 
extended, the other fingers half closed, and the palm facing left. 
It is then brought back to rest on the leg, closing almost into a 
fist. At the same time, the left hand also moves slightly towards 
the side of the body, then returns to its previous position and 
then moves towards the side again 
and to draw some 
general 
conclusions from 
the symbolic use 
the different 
cultures have 
made20 of them 
 
 
GESTURAL INFORMATION UPTAKE 
 
 
 44 
Appendix 2C Examples of sentences used for the Recognition Task of Experiment 3. 
Literal  Green evokes the restorative thought of nature. 
Paraphrases The color evoking the restorative thought of nature is green.  
Wrong   Green evokes the sense of tiredness of nature.  
 
Literal   Blue is refreshing like water. 
Paraphrases  Blue color gives a feeling of freshness like water. 
Wrong   Blue color is fresh like sea. 
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Table 1. Mean correct performance with the different sorts of sentences in the three 
experimental conditions in Experiment 1.  
 
 
Condition 
Literally correct 
(n = 8) 
Paraphrases 
(n = 8) 
Wrong content 
(n = 8) 
Gesture (n = 20) 
M 
SD 
 
4.65 
1.35 
 
6.90 
1.20 
 
4.70 
2.06 
Unrelated (n = 20) 
M 
SD 
 
6.15 
.99 
 
6.00 
1.45 
 
5.65 
1.35 
No Gesture (n = 20) 
M 
SD 
 
5.60 
.94 
 
6.15 
1.18 
 
5.55 
1.19 
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Table 2. Mean types of recollections in the three conditions of Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
Condition 
Correct 
recollections 
 
Discourse-based 
inferences 
Elaborative 
inferences 
 
Errors 
Gesture (n = 20) 
M 
SD 
 
9.45 
1.82 
 
.40 
.50 
 
.10 
.31 
 
.10 
.31 
Unrelated (n = 20) 
M 
SD 
 
7.10 
2.05 
 
.10 
.31 
 
.15 
.37 
 
.50 
.61 
No Gesture (n = 20) 
M 
SD 
 
7.30 
1.69 
 
.10 
.31 
 
0 
- 
 
.50 
.51 
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Table 3. Mean correct performance with the different sorts of sentences in the three 
experimental conditions in Experiment 3.  
 
 
Condition 
Literally correct 
(n = 8) 
Paraphrases 
(n = 8) 
Wrong content 
(n = 8) 
Gesture (n = 15) 
M 
SD 
 
3.40 
1.40 
 
5.53 
1.25 
 
4.27 
1.71 
Unrelated (n = 15) 
M 
SD 
 
5.27 
0.96 
 
4.93 
1.03 
 
4.67 
1.35 
No Gesture (n = 15) 
M 
SD 
 
4.60 
1.24 
 
5.73 
0.88 
 
5.13 
1.30 
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Table 4. Mean types of recollections in the three conditions of Experiment 4. 
 
 
 
 
Condition 
Correct 
recollections 
Discourse-based 
inferences 
Elaborative 
inferences 
 
Errors 
Gesture (n = 15) 
M 
SD 
 
5.53 
1.36 
 
.53 
.52 
 
.13 
.35 
 
.20 
.41 
Unrelated (n = 15) 
M 
SD 
3.00 
.93 
.20 
.41 
.13 
.35 
.53 
.52 
No Gesture (n = 15) 
M 
SD 
 
3.60 
1.30 
 
.13 
.35 
 
.07 
.29 
 
.53 
.52 
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Fig. 1. Frames from the Funfair discourse video of Experiments 1 and 2. They depict the 
agent’s gestures while saying the word “big” of the sentence “It was a very big funfair”. 
Frame (a) belongs to the gesture condition, frame (b) to the unrelated condition, and frame (c) 
to the no gesture condition.  
 
         
 
  Frame (a)    Frame (b)        Frame (c) 
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Fig. 2. Frames from the Color discourse video of Experiments 3 and 4. They depict the 
agent’s gestures while saying the word “water” of the sentence “and blue is refreshing like 
water”. Frame (a) belongs to the gesture condition, frame (b) to the rnrelated condition, and 
frame (c) to the no gesture condition.  
 
 
       
  Frame (a)    Frame (b)        Frame (c) 
 
 
 
 
 
